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Introduction 
 
 In the 2001, the Rumsfeld Commission released a report that stated 
that the United States needed to secure itself against a "Space Pearl 
Harbor."1 This was in reaction to the U.S. military's increasing dependence 
on satellite technology. According to the report, such dependence could 
allow for adversaries to gain an asymmetric advantage over the United 
States by targeting its space assets during a conflict. A similar advantage 
could be gained by the United States by targeting the limited assets of 
smaller rivals during conflicts. Regardless of who is targeting whom it seems 
that the traditional arenas for warfare (land, sea, and air) may soon have a 
younger brother in space.2 
 
 These problems have been brought to the forefront in recent years 
since both China3 and the United States4 have demonstrated anti-satellite 
(ASAT) capabilities. While these incidents have been followed by attempts 
to ban weapons from space in the forms of draft treaties and codes of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Research Counsel, National Center for Remote Sensing, Air, and Space Law 
University of Mississippi School of Law. 
1 Comm’n to Assess U.S. Nat’l Sec. Space Mgmt. & Org., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 
TO ASSESS UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE MANAGEMENT AND 
ORGANIZATION viii (2001), available at 
http://space.au.af.mil/space_commission/space20010111.pdf. 
2 See generally YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 19–24 (4th ed. 
2005). 
3 See generally SHIRLEY KAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22652, CHINA’S ANTI-
SATELLITE WEAPON TEST (2007), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22652.pdf. 
4 See generally USA-193: SELECTED DOCUMENTS (P.J. Blount & Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz 
eds., 2009), available at http://www.spacelaw.olemiss.edu/resources/pdfs/usa193-selected-
documents.pdf. 
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conduct, no such legal instrument has yet to be adopted.5 These attempts 
are well intentioned disarmament initiatives; however, they may not be 
politically feasible in the near term. This does not mean that the use of 
weapons in space is necessarily an unbounded activity. Both space law and 
general international law (including International Humanitarian Law) place 
restrictions on the use of weapons in outer space.  
 
 This Article will address the legal issues involved with the targeting 
of space assets through analysis of problems that are specific to the space 
environment. Specifically, it will address issues such as discrimination of 
targets, the issues relating to satellites that are administered by international 
organizations or by a multiplicity of nations, and the problem of orbital 
debris. 
 
I. The Concept of Space War 
 
 One of the underlying principles of space law is that space will be 
used for "peaceful purposes." This principle can be found in both the UN 
General Assembly resolution on the legal principles applicable to outer 
space6 and in the Outer Space Treaty.7 Furthermore, the principle has 
likely solidified as a part of customary international law. The state practice 
on the matter can be seen in its ubiquitous usage of the principle in 
statements, treaties, and policies of space faring nations.8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See, e.g., Draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of 
the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects, in letter dated Feb. 12, 2008 
from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation and the Permanent 
Representative of China to the Conference on Disarmament addressed to the Secretary-
General of the conference, U.N. Doc. CD/1839 (Feb. 29, 2008) and Council of the 
European Union, Council Conclusions concerning the revised draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space 
Activities, Council Doc. 14455/10 (Oct. 11, 2010). 
6 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1962(XVIII) (Dec. 13, 
1963). 
7 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, available at 
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf [hereinafter Outer Space 
Treaty]. 
8 See, e.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (2010), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_space_policy_6-28-
10.pdf (“All nations have the right to explore and use space for peaceful purposes, and for 
the benefit of all humanity, in accordance with international law. Consistent with this 
principle, ‘peaceful purposes’ allows for space to be used for national and homeland 
3 Harvard National Security Journal Features 
  
 While it is relatively easy to say that "peaceful purposes" is an 
underlying principle of the law of Outer Space, it is much more difficult to 
define the content of that norm. It can be asserted that at a minimum, 
"peaceful purposes" can be read to mean non-aggressive and therefore 
equal to the prohibition on the use of force found under the UN Charter.9 
While one can read the Outer Space Treaty and the associated body of 
space law to mean that conflicts are forbidden in space, it is incumbent to 
read any such measure in light of international law in general. Article III of 
the Outer Space Treaty incorporates international law and specifically the 
Charter of the United Nations into the space law regime.10 Furthermore, it 
quotes the UN Charter by declaring that the treaty's purpose is to promote 
"international peace and security."11 This means that the Outer Space 
Treaty shares one of the main underlying principles of the UN Charter. The 
UN Charter bans the use of aggressive force, but allows for self-defense and 
Security Council-sanctioned use of force. Similarly, the Outer Space 
Treaty's ban on the aggressive use of force cannot be read to completely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
security activities.”); Statement by Hu Xiaodi, in U.N. GAOR, First Comm., 57th Sess., 
12th mtg, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/57/PV.12 (Oct. 15, 2002) (“Using outer space for 
peaceful purposes reflects the common will and fundamental interests of the international 
community.”); Iran rocket launch non-military – ambassador, RIA NOVOSTI, Feb. 8, 2008, 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20080208/98732321.html (“The recent launch of an Iranian 
research rocket was strictly for peaceful purposes, and was designed to obtain 
meteorological data, the Islamic republic's ambassador to Moscow said on Friday.”); 
Preparations for Launch of Experimental Communications Satellite in Full Gear, KCNA, Feb. 24, 2009 
in THE NORTH KOREAN EXPENDABLE CARRIER ROCKET, UNHA-2: SELECTED LEGAL 
DOCUMENTS 31 (2010), available at 
http://www.spacelaw.olemiss.edu/resources/pdfs/north-korean-rocket.pdf (“The DPRK 
has steadily pushed ahead with researches and development for putting satellites into orbit 
by its own efforts and technology since the 1980s, pursuant to its government's policy for 
the development of space and its peaceful use.”); Unofficial Translation of the Government 
of Russian Federation Resolution of May 15, 1995, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE 
AFFAIRS, 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/SpaceLaw/national/russian_federation/resolution_468_19
95E.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2011) (“The Russian Space Agency (RSA) is a federal body 
of executive power which ensures implementation of the state policy in the field of research 
and use of outer space for peaceful purposes . . . .”). 
9 P. J. Blount, Limits on Space Weapons: Incorporating the Law of War into the Corpus Juris Spatialis, 
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW 235, 236–38 
(Corinne M. Contant Jorgenson ed., 2008). 
10 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. III. 
11 Id. 
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preclude the use of force in space. In fact this is borne out by state practice, 
through the defensive stances that States take in relation to outer space.12 
  
For this reason, it is essential that the rules of international armed 
conflict be extended into space. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has 
made it clear that international humanitarian law applies to new 
technologies—the only question is how they apply.13 While Article III of the 
Outer Space Treaty does the leg work as far as making the rules applicable, 
one cannot simply take rules that were developed for the land, sea, and air 
environment and apply them to the space environment. This is due to the 
vastly different arena that space presents to the military. However, if one 
starts at one of the basic tenets of international humanitarian law—that 
parties to a conflict do not have unlimited means and methods of warfare—
then one can begin to work out the contours of how armed conflict in space 
will be governed by law.14 
  
II. Targeting in International Armed Conflict 
 
 The process of targeting is the process by which military officials 
choose objectives to attack in an armed conflict. For instance the U.S. Air 
Force defines targeting as: 
  
The process through which objectives are selected for attack and 
desired effects are determined based upon a stated mission, force 
posture and capabilities, aerospace doctrine, plans, concepts of 
operations, and target intelligence.15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For instance, the United States Space Policy recognizes a right “consistent with the 
inherent right of self-defense, [to] deter others from interference and attack, defend our 
space systems and contribute to the defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, 
defeat efforts to attack them.” THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 8, at 3. 
13 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 
¶¶ 85–87 (July 8). 
14 See THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 126 (Dieter Fleck ed., 
2nd ed. 2008) [hereinafter Fleck]. See also San Remo Manual on International Law 
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, art 38, June 12, 1994, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c12563da005fdb1b/7694fe2016f347e1c
125641f002d49ce!OpenDocument; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol I) art. 35(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Convention with 
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), art. 22, July 29, 1899, 32 
Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247. 
15 U.S. AIR FORCE, USAF INTELLIGENCE TARGETING GUIDE 127 (1998). 
5 Harvard National Security Journal Features 
 
The process is one that takes into account both pre-attack and post-attack 
considerations. Pre-attack considerations are those that concern whether the 
target is a legitimate military objective. Post attack considerations are those 
that consider the effects that an attack on the potential target will have on 
civilians, civilian objects, and the environment. The USAF definition is not 
limited to legal considerations, since targeting necessarily entails other 
considerations that the military must take into account when selecting and 
attacking.16 However, it should be noted that any selection is bounded by 
legal considerations, or in other words, the target selected must be a legal 
target and the effects that accrue from the attack must be legal as well, 
regardless of other considerations taken into account by the attack 
planner.17 
 
 Pre-attack legal considerations require that a planner of attacks 
verify that potential targets are legitimate military objective and not 
"civilians nor civilian objects."18 This is, as stated by the International Court 
of Justice, one of the "cardinal principles" of international humanitarian 
law.19 According to Additional Protocol I: 
 
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as 
objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects 
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, 
capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, 
offers a definite military advantage.20  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 See generally MATTHEW C. WAXMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF 
URBAN AIR OPERATIONS chap. 3 (2000). 
17 U.S. AIR FORCE, supra note 15, at 147 ("During planning, targeting personnel must 
contend with two external sources of restrictions on weapons and target selection. First, and 
most basic, are the constraints imposed by international law."). 
18 WAXMAN, supra note 16, at 12. 
19 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 13, at 78. 
20 AP I, supra note 14, art. 52.2. Although the United States is not a party to Additional 
Protocol I, it does view much of the Treaty as part of International Customary Law. In this 
particular context the United States views the first two paragraphs of article 52 as 
customary international law. See Memorandum for John H. McNeill, Assistant General 
Counsel (International) OSD (May 9, 1986) in THE UNITED STATES ARMY JUDGE 
ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL, LAW OF WAR DOCUMENTARY 
SUPPLEMENT 399, 399 (2007). 
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All objects that are not military objectives are considered to be civilian 
objects.21 It is therefore incumbent upon the planner to evaluate the nature, 
location, and use of an objective and to gauge whether that is making an 
effective contribution to military action. 
  
 Post attack legal considerations require that a planner determine 
whether an attack will be considered indiscriminate. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross states that indiscriminate attacks are: 
 
 (a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective; 
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat which cannot 
be directed at a specific military objective; or 
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of 
which cannot be limited as required by international humanitarian 
law.22 
 
In each of these cases the attack must also be "of the nature to strike military 
objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction."23 Planners 
must therefore choose targets that will not result in "a reckless disregard of 
the principle of distinction."24 In other words attack planners cannot choose 
a target that would have the effect of causing an egregious loss of civilian life 
or property. 
 
III. Verification of Targets 
 
When targeting, the attack planner must verify that the potential 
target is a legitimate military objective and not a civilian object. This can be 
a difficult process in space. The nature of the space environment is such that 
it is nearly impossible to get a firsthand look at the satellites and other space 
objects in orbit. It is necessary then for a planner to gather information on 
potential targets from a variety of intelligence sources. These, however, may 
lead to an incomplete picture of exactly what is being targeted. 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 AP I, supra note 14, art. 52(1). The United States views this provision as customary 
international law. Memorandum for John H. McNeill, supra note 20, at 399.  
22 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW Rule 12 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck 2005). See 
also AP I, supra note 14, art. 51(4). 
23 AP I, supra note 14, art. 51(4). 
24 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 117 (2004). 
7 Harvard National Security Journal Features 
A primary source of information on space objects is the United 
Nations Registry of Space Objects. The Registration Convention requires 
all nations who launch a space object to register these objects on national 
registers. In the case of two or more launching States, the States should 
determine between themselves which will register the object.25 In turn, the 
convention requires the State of registry to register the space object on the 
United Nations register.26 However, the Convention only requires a 
minimal amount of information: 
 
(a) Name of the launching State or States; 
(b) An appropriate designator of the space object or its 
registration number; 
(c) Date and territory or location of the launch; 
(d) Basic orbital parameters, including: 
i. Nodal period; 
ii. Inclination; 
iii. Apogee; 
iv. Perigee; 
(e) General function of the space object.27 
 
The limited nature of this information makes it difficult to use the 
UN register to determine what a space object does. The "[g]eneral function 
of the space object" was intentionally left broad by the drafters of the treaty 
so that space faring nations would feel at ease entering information onto the 
registry. However, these descriptions can be misleading. For instance, USA-
193 was a National Reconnaissance Office remote sensing satellite,28 and 
the general function listed for it on the UN Registry states that it is a 
"[s]pacecraft engaged in practical applications and uses of space technology 
such as weather or communications."29 In comparison, Landsat 5, a civil 
remote sensing satellite,30 is also stated to be a "[s]pacecraft engaged in 
practical applications and uses of space technology such as weather or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space art. 2, opened for 
signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration 
Convention].  
26 Id. art. IV. 
27 Id. 
28 UNOOSA Register of Space Objects: USA 193 (as of Jan. 14, 2009) in USA-193: SELECTED 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 15. 
29 See generally, USA-193: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 4. 
30 Landsat 5 History, UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SERVICE, 
http://landsat.usgs.gov/about_landsat5.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).  
2012 / Targeting in Outer Space    
	  
8	  
communications."31 The registry does not disclose either the military or civil 
nature of the satellites registered. Additionally, not all satellites get 
registered. The UN Register lists 438 space objects that are not registered 
with the UN.32 One of these is a NATO satellite that would most likely have 
some sort of military use.33 
 
 The planner can also turn to information found in the satellite 
tracking databases. These databases give orbital parameters for objects in 
orbit. However these parameters are only estimates and are not exact. For 
instance the recent collision of Cosmos-2251 and Iridium 33 was not avoided 
due to the fact that the estimated orbits were incorrect.34 The satellite 
collision was not even in the top 150 close calls being monitored that day by 
Analytical Graphics, a commercial satellite tracking company.35 A State's 
ability to know where a satellite is in orbit "depends on the type and number 
of sensors it has to observe the satellite and the software it has to calculate, 
based on its observations, the satellite's orbit and location at a future time."36 
It is also problematic for other nations that the most complete data sets are 
collected and distributed by the United States.37 
  
 While states can bolster this information from other intelligence 
sources and open sources, it is still difficult to determine what is doing what 
in space. If, for example, a State knew that an adversary was using high 
resolution remote sensing imagery to determine troop locations and that 
that adversary had multiple remote sensing satellites, then there might be no 
possible way for the targeting state to determine which satellite was tasked 
with imaging its territory. This is very problematic when a State is presented 
with a variety of potential targets. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer Space, UNOOSA, 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosa/search.do (last visited Mar. 30, 2011). 
32 Id. Many of these were launched before the Registration Convention existed, but the 
majority are from after that time period. Id. 
33 Id. See the entry for NATO 3D which has the international designator 1984-115A. 
34 Becky Iannotta, Satellite Crash: Who's to Blame?, SPACE.COM, Feb. 17, 2009, 
http://www.space.com/4312-satellite-crash-blame.html.  
35 Id. 
36 DAVID WRIGHT, ET AL., THE PHYSICS OF SPACE SECURITY: A REFERENCE MANUAL 
160 (2005), available at 
http://www.amacad.org/publications/Physics_of_Space_Security.pdf. 
37 See generally T.S. Kelso, Space Surveillance, SATELLITE TIMES, Sept./Oct. 1997, 
http://celestrak.com/columns/v04n01/; Space Surveillance, AIR UNIVERSITY, 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usspc-fs/space.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2011). 
9 Harvard National Security Journal Features 
IV. Types of Targets 
 
 Space assets come in a variety of flavors from the purely military to 
the purely commercial. For the purposes of defining targets, these assets can 
be seen as a spectrum. The planner of a given attack must be able to discern 
the issues that each potential target presents. 
 
A. Military Satellites 
 
 Historically the "armed forces of the adversary" have served as the 
core of the category of legitimate military objectives.38 Therefore it is logical 
that "equipment serving a navy or air force for combat purposes" is “valid as 
a military objective.”39 It follows that a military satellite is a legitimate 
military objective since it would be used for force enhancement in combat 
situations.40 It could also be argued that military satellites are "objects for 
immediate combat service support," which also constitute legitimate military 
objectives.41 Satellites can be used to provide battlefield intelligence in the 
form of weather information or geospatial information, and they can 
facilitate advanced communications. In terrestrial, naval, or air warfare 
military objects that perform such services for troops would traditionally be 
considered legitimate military objectives; thus it makes sense that the same 
could be true of such objects in outer space. This principle is linked to the 
nature, purpose, and use of the object as required under IHL. 
 
B. Civil Satellites 
 
 Governments often have civil satellites that are not run by the 
military. For instance the United States Geographical Survey (USGS) 
administers the Landsat satellite system. These satellites collect remote 
sensing data that is then distributed worldwide on a nondiscriminatory 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Fleck, supra note 14, at 181. 
39 Id. at 182. 
40 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. MUOLO, SPACE HANDBOOK: A WAR FIGHTER’S GUIDE TO SPACE 
VOLUME ONE 73 (Ricgard A. Hand et al eds., 1993) (“The Air Force views space as a 
medium, like the air or sea, in which to carry out different types of missions. Air Force 
doctrine specifically integrates space missions into the four basic roles performed by 
aerospace forces: force support, force enhancement, aerospace control, and force 
application.”). 
41 Fleck, supra note 14, at 182. 
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basis.42 The fact that a satellite is owned and operated by a government 
does not by default make the satellite a military objective. The 
Government's ownership does not mean that the "nature" of the satellite has 
become military. Nor does its purpose of imaging other States’ territories 
make it a valid target. However, if the use of such a satellite becomes 
primarily military then it could be argued that the satellite could become a 
valid military target. For instance if the military was making extensive use of 
Landsat data and this data was being withheld from the rest of the world in a 
discriminatory way, then it is reasonable to assume that the use of the 
system has been altered in such a way that an adversary would be justified 
in attacking it. An analogy can be found in that of government buildings 
and offices in land warfare. These objectives are only legitimate objectives 
"when used in pursuance or support of military functions."43  
 
C. Commercial Satellites 
 
 Generally civilian objects cannot be made the target of an attack. 
However, international humanitarian law allows for "commercial objectives 
which make an effective contribution to military action" to become valid 
targets.44 Civilian objects that are dedicated to civilian usages remain invalid 
targets "as long as they fulfill only their essential function."45 It is important 
to note that the mere potential for an object to be used for a military 
purpose does not necessarily create a situation wherein that object becomes 
a valid military objective.46 Instead the object must be actively "mak[ing] an 
effective contribution to military action."47 
 
 For example, during an armed conflict a satellite radio company's 
(such as XM) assets could be effectively used for military communications. 
However, if that company is only supplying its customers with routine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 102-555,§ 2(10), 106 Stat. 4162, 4163 
(1992) (“Regardless of management responsibilities for the Landsat program, the Nation's 
broad civilian, national security, commercial, and foreign policy interests in remote sensing 
will best be served by ensuring that Landsat remains an unclassified program that operates 
according to the principles of open skies and nondiscriminatory access.”) (originally codified 
at 15 U.S.C. §5602(10), but since moved to 51 U.S.C. §60101 (historical and revision 
notes)). 
43 DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 98. 
44 Fleck, supra note 14, at 181. 
45 DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 90–91. 
46 Id. at 85–86. 
47 AP I, supra note 14, art. 52(2). The United States views this provision as customary 
international law. Memorandum for John H. McNeill, supra note 20, 399. 
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satellite radio services then the satellites may not become targets. This can 
be analogized to the classic example of whether a civilian TV station is a 
legitimate target.48 Dinstein notes that the Committee Established to 
Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia stated that attacks on TV and Radio stations "could be justified 
only if the TV and radio transmitters were integrated into the military 
command and control communications network."49 That view can be 
contrasted with Hague Cultural Property Convention, which refers to 
"broadcasting stations" as important military objectives.50 These two 
examples leave the question open. However, one can safely assert that when 
commercial telecommunications satellites begin to assist the military with 
command and control type functions they open themselves up as potential 
targets.  
 
There are situations in which militaries become the customers of a 
satellite company, such as the one that occurred during the U.S. invasion of 
Afghanistan. During this operation the U.S. military exercised “shutter” 
control by becoming the sole customer for remote sensing images of the 
combat zone.51 While the motivation for such action was to keep such 
images out of the adversary's hands in order to protect U.S. troops, it is 
likely that these images were used to help military strategists in planning and 
execution of the ground operations. In this case it could be argued that the 
Geo-Eye satellites were making an "effective contribution to the military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 98. 
49 Id. (citing Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the 
NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 ILM 1257, 
1279 (2000)). The same committee noted that if the attack had been to battle propaganda 
from the station then the "legal status [of the attack] was considered more debatable." 
Fleck, supra note 14, at 183 (citing Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee 
Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, 39 ILM 1257, 1278 ¶¶ 75–76 (2000).  
50 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 
8(1)(a), May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240. 
51 David Whitehouse, US Buys Afghan Image Rights, BBC, Oct. 17, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/1604426.stm. It should be noted that the 
United States regulations on remote sensing satellites allows the government to exercise 
shutter control via the mechanism of buying exclusive rights to the data. 15 C.F.R. § 
960.11(4) (2010) (“The licensee may be required by the Secretary to limit data  
collection and/or distribution by the system as determined to be necessary to meet 
significant national security or significant foreign policy concerns, or international 
obligations of the United States . . . During such limitations, the licensee shall, on request, 
provide unenhanced restricted images on a commercial basis exclusively to the U.S. 
Government . . . “). 
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action" and would be a valid target. In fact, "[i]telligence-gathering centres 
related to the war effort (even when not run by the military establishment)" 
are considered targets.52 
 
 A final problem presented by commercial satellites, is whether those 
registered to neutral parties to a conflict can become valid targets. For 
instance, if a belligerent is buying imagery from a third party and that 
party's satellite is registered to a neutral state, does the third party's satellite 
become a valid target. In this instance, the law of neutrality must be 
examined. “Neutral state[s] must not assist [parties] to the conflict”;53 this 
rule includes a duty for neutral states to "prohibit export and transit of war 
material by private persons for the benefit of one of the parties to the 
conflict."54 However, current opinion juris considers war material to consist of 
weapons strict sensu.55 It is doubtful then that remote sensing imagery 
provided by a commercial vendor would be considered a "war material." 
However, the reasoning behind this rule carries an analogy to space 
activities.  
 
The traditional rule of neutrality allowed for private citizens to 
export armaments, but States began to recognize that "[t]he separation of 
the state and the private armaments industry is nowadays artificial and does 
not correspond with political reality."56 An extension of this means that "[t]o 
the extent that arms export is subject to control by the state, the permission 
of such export is to be considered as a non-neutral service."57 In a similar 
way space activities of commercial actors are not necessarily separated from 
the State. Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, requires States to execute 
"continuing supervision" over the national activities of non-State actors.58 
This continuing supervision is usually manifested in a licensing scheme by 
the State.59 Furthermore, Article VIII grants "jurisdiction and control" over 
a satellite to the registering State, this jurisdiction and control creates a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 89. 
53 Fleck, supra note 14, at 584. 
54 Id. at 585. 
55 Id. at 586 ("i.e. material which is capable of being used for killing enemy soldiers or 
destroying enemy goods."). 
56 Id. at 585. 
57 Id. 
58 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. VI. 
59 See JULIAN HERMIDA, LEGAL BASIS FOR A NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION chap. II 
(2004) (examination of “Implementation of the Authorization and Supervision Principle” 
for most listed States show that some version of a licensing regime is used). 
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further connection between the neutral State and the activities taking place 
on a satellite. It can be argued that there is a fundamental connection 
between a State and the activities of the satellite for which it has jurisdiction 
and/or supervisory duties. The fact that State responsibility attaches to at 
least some actions of non-State actors taking part in space activities is 
compelling evidence that a State is just as involved with space activities as it 
would be with arms exports.60 Therefore, the commercial satellite may 
become a legitimate military objective by virtue of the fact that non-neutral 
activities are occurring from onboard.  
 
Of course, this view is not absolute. The State only has a duty to 
continually supervise to the extent that the activities taking place on the 
satellite are national ones.61 Also, international norms could bear on this 
situation, such as the principle of nondiscriminatory access embodied in UN 
General Assembly Resolution on Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of 
the Earth from Outer Space.62 Or the principle that neutral States need not 
prohibit belligerents from using telecommunications "apparatus belonging 
to it or companies or to private individuals"63 or engaging in private 
commercial transactions with its citizens.64 It is possible that navigation and 
communications provided by a neutral State's commercial satellites would 
not constitute a breach of neutrality, but that remote sensing of an 
adversary's troop positions would constitute a breach and make the satellite 
a legitimate target.  
  
D. Satellites Run by International Organizations 
 
 Numerous satellites are operated by international organizations or 
by a multiplicity of states. The classic example being Intelsat, which started as 
a "user-owned cooperative to which national governments became a 
party."65 Under this framework, once a State became a party to the Intelsat 
treaty, "its government . . . designated an operating organization to invest in 
the satellite system."66 These sorts of systems, with a multiplicity of actors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. VI. 
61 Id. 
62 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space art. XII, G.A. Res. 
41/65, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 95th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/Res/41/65 (Dec. 3, 1986). 
63 Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of 
War on Land (Hague V) art. 8, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat 2310, T.S. No. 540. 
64 David L. Willson, An Army View of Neutrality in Space, 50 A.F.L. REV. 195 (2001). 
65 ROGER COCHETTI, MOBILE SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS HANDBOOK 9 (1995).  
66 Id. 
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and a quasi State-commercial framework, hold numerous problems for the 
legal advisor to an attack planner.  
 
In Operation Desert Storm space assets were used to such an extent 
that it has been referred to as the first space war67 and "a watershed event 
for the advancement of space information to the war-fighting personnel."68 
One of the specific uses of space assets was communications, and during the 
operation the U.S. military supplemented its communications capabilities 
by buying bandwidth on Inmarsat satellites.69 Inmarsat is a 
telecommunications satellite system that was originally set up as an 
international organization with the purpose of "provid[ing] satellite-based, 
commercial communications services to ships, aircraft, and other mobile 
users."70 In 1999, Inmarsat became the "first intergovernmental 
organisation to transform into a private company," and it is publicly traded 
on the London stock exchange.71 While Inmarsat has a commercial 
character, it is still overseen by an international organization, the 
International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO), which retains a 
"'special share' in Inmarsat Ltd which provides a mechanism to ensure that 
any commercial decisions taken are not detrimental to the public services." 
72 This organization currently has 95 member states.73 The governing treaty 
for IMSO states that States shall "act exclusively for peaceful purposes" 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Gordon D. Issler, Space Warfare Meets Information Warfare, JOINT FORCES QUARTERLY, 
Autumn 2000, at 100. Issler does take issue with this notion claiming instead that 
“[b]ecause the ability of the United States to operate in space was not challenged, there was 
no battle for space superiority. However there was a contest for information superiority.” 
Id. 
68 MUOLO, supra note 40, at 47. 
69 U.S. Army Space Division, Army Space Reference Text 7–20, available at 
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/army/ref_text/index.html#CH7SEC2 ("During 
Operation DESERT STORM there were more than 150 small INMARSAT terminals in 
use by the US and coalition military forces, the CNN news team in Baghdad, Kuwaiti 
resistance fighters, and others. INMARSAT terminals provide connectivity and 
compatibility between each of the U.S. military services, its allies and other agencies 
equipped with an INMARSAT terminal. INMARSAT terminals were also used 
successfully in Somalia."). 
70 COCHETTI, supra note 65, at 69. 
71 About Inmarsat, INMARSAT, 
http://www.inmarsat.com/About/?language=EN&textonly=False (last visited Nov. 9, 
2011). 
72 What is IMSO?, IMSO, http://www.imso.org/whatisimso_UK.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 
2011). 
73 List of Parties To The Convention On The International Mobile Satellite Organization, IMSO, 
http://www.imso.org/member_states.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2011). 
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while carrying out the purposes of the treaty.74 However, the structure of 
Inmarsat is such that almost any entity can use its services including terrorist 
organizations,75 and Inmarsat itself markets its services to the defense 
organizations.76  
 
While there is strong support for the concept that that these services 
do not violate the peaceful purposes principle found in international law, 
these actions may still "make an effective contribution to military action."77 
One must then question whether a satellite's multinational nature would 
have an effect on its status as a legitimate military objective. Inmarsat is a 
public private partnership, but it is substantially controlled by an 
international organization. The multinational character becomes more 
complex when it is taken into account that member States of a multinational 
organization may also be neutral states. In the case of Inmarsat, it can be 
presumed that since both the United States and Iraq are State parties of the 
IMSO that the military use of Inmarsat did not violate the treaty and the 
destruction of an Inmarsat satellite by either party would have violated the 
IMSO agreement's peaceful purposes provisions. There is, though, the 
potential for a situation in which at least one belligerent is not a party to 
such an agreement. In this situation it seems that there would be a political 
outcry over the destruction of such a satellite, but it is unclear as to whether 
the destruction would be illegal.78 
 
E. Human Space Stations 
 
Another potential target in space would be that of a space station 
containing humans. The problems here stem from the status mixtus (i.e. they 
may fall into two different legal classifications at the same time) that 
astronauts aboard a space station may have. Traditionally, under 
international space law astronauts are considered the "envoys of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Convention on The International Mobile Satellite Organization art. 3(a), Sept. 3, 1976, 
http://www.imso.org/pdfs/Public/Basic%20Documents/Convention/P%20-
%20IMSO%20CONVENTION%20-%20ENGLISH.pdf. 
75 For example Osama Bin Laden had an InMarsat phone. See Duncan Campbell, How the 
Plotters Slipped US Net, THE GAURDIAN, SEPT. 27, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2001/sep/27/onlinesupplement.afghanistan. 
76 See Services for Defense, INMARSAT (Sept. 2009), 
http://www.inmarsat.com/Downloads/English/Government/Govt_Services_for_defence
_EN.pdf?language=EN&textonly=False. 
77 AP I, supra note 14, art. 52(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27. 
78 Such an attack might allow other States to enter into hostilities. 
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mankind."79 States are required to render assistance to and to return to the 
launching State astronauts that land in distress either in the territory of that 
state or on the high seas.80 Some authors have argued that the classification 
of “envoys of mankind” gives astronauts diplomatic immunity,81 however 
such an interpretation is not borne out by the plain meaning of the text of 
the Outer Space Treaty.82 It would seem reasonable that the outbreak of 
conflict could constitute a "fundamental change in circumstances," which 
could allow for an astronaut to change from the status of an envoy of 
mankind to that of a combatant.83 
 
Astronaut corps are often made up of military personnel even in civil 
space programs.84 International humanitarian law allows for the targeting of 
"all members of the armed forces, whether or not they are actually engaged 
in combat."85 Thus the question must be asked whether military personnel 
are afforded a special protection when participating as astronauts. Such 
distinction will most likely have to be made on a case by case basis. For 
instance, if the personnel are actively engaged in military activities 
supporting combat operations86 any immunity given by the Outer Space 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. V, 18 U.S.T. at 2414, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208.  
80 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space arts. 2-4, opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 
7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and Return Agreement]. 
81 See Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 
48 A.F.L. Rev. 1, 150–53 (2000). 
82 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
83 Id. art. 62, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347. But see LaToya Tate, The Status of the Outer Space Treaty at 
International Law During “War” and “Those Measures Short of War,” 32 J. Space L. 177, 192–93 
(2006). 
84 NASA states that of its 94 Mission Specialists 32 are military. NASA, Astronaut 
Selection: Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://nasajobs.nasa.gov/astronauts/content/faq.htm (last visited May 16, 2011), archived 
at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20101024135556/http://nasajobs.nasa.gov/astronauts/cont
ent/faq.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2012) (Internet archive from Oct. 24, 2010, as the 
information has since been removed from the site). 
85 DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 94. 
86 There are few if any examples of such behavior. A weak one might be when a Russian 
cosmonaut photographed the area of conflict when Russia was engaged in armed conflict 
with Georgia in 2008. Frank Morring, Jr., Cosmonaut Photographed South Ossetia From ISS, 
AVIATION WEEK, Aug. 22, 2008, 
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/
OSS08228.xml. However, Russia claimed that these photographs were used for 
humanitarian assistance. Id. 
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Treaty may be lost since such activities would be in conflict with the rules of 
diplomatic immunity.87 It might also be relevant whether there are civilian 
astronauts on board the station with the military astronaut; if so, the 
collateral damage caused by targeting the military astronaut may be too 
great to allow the attack.88 It should be noted that if these civil personnel are 
also participating in the warfighting effort then they expose themselves to 
the risk of being targeted.89 
 
 The tough fact pattern is the military astronaut who is not taking 
part in hostilities. While political and strategic considerations would not 
make this individual a likely target,90 the question remains as to whether the 
individual would be a legal target. If diplomatic immunity is granted as part 
of the envoy of mankind status then this question may turn on the status of 
the Outer Space Treaty between the two parties during the conflict. One 
argument is that the Outer Space Treaty is a law making treaty and 
therefore it remains in force, making the military astronaut an illegal 
target.91 However, it could also be argued that a "fundamental change in 
circumstance" has taken place between the two parties and that the 
recognition of envoy status is no longer in force between the two. This 
would be similar to politicians (and in particular the head of state that serves 
as a commander in chief) who also serve in the military.92 Fortunately, such 
a situation as this seems far removed, but it should be noted that military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations states that a “receiving State must, 
even in case of armed conflict, grant facilities in order to enable persons enjoying privileges 
and immunities . . . to leave at the earliest possible moment.” The Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations art. 44, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3277, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. Diplomatic 
immunity is a function of diplomatic relations, which only take place “by mutual consent.” 
Id. art. 2. It stands to reason that if diplomatic immunity does exist for astronauts it ceases 
at the outbreak of hostilities and the breakdown of diplomatic relations. Since the astronaut 
would not be in the territory of the receiving state then there would be no further duties 
owed to the sending state in relation to that immunity.  
88 DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 120 (“The principle of proportionality . . . [disallows] attacks 
against impeccable military objectives owing to anticipated disproportionate injury and 
damage to civilians or civilian objects.”). 
89 Id. at 129. 
90 See generally MATTHEW C. WAXMAN, supra note 16, at chap. 3. 
91 Tate, supra note 83, at 193. 
92 Heads of State generally are not targets by virtue of their political position, however 
those that serve as the commander in chief are valid targets in armed conflict. DINSTEIN, 
supra note 24, at 99. 
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uses of space stations have been contemplated,93 and that new nations are 
looking to enter this part of space exploration.94 
  
V. The Physics of Space and Indiscriminate Attacks 
 
 One of the most important limiting factors for the strategic uses of 
space is the physics of space. When an object is destroyed in space its 
fragments can remain orbiting the Earth as space debris. Space debris is "all 
man made objects including fragments and elements thereof, in Earth orbit 
or re-entering the atmosphere, that are non functional."95 All objects in 
space orbit at a very high velocity; for this reason, space debris poses a 
threat to other objects.96 There are currently 19,000 tracked items of space 
debris over 10 cm, and untracked debris under 10 cm is probably in the tens 
of millions.97 An example of how the destruction of a space object can affect 
the amount of space debris can be found in the Chinese destruction of FY-
1C. This ASAT test resulted in the creation of 2317 pieces of tracked debris 
making China "responsible for nearly half of all known and tracked satellite 
breakup debris currently in Earth orbit.”98 Strategically, militaries that are 
reliant on space assets understand the risk that debris pose to these assets 
and would most likely avoid an attack that destroyed a space object in orbit. 
However, a lesser military power looking to take advantage of a space 
power's reliance on space assets could see such an attack as a very inviting.99 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 See generally Christopher M. Petras, "Space Force Alpha": Military Use of the International Space 
Station and the Concept of "Peaceful Purposes," 53 A.F.L. REV. 135 (2002). 
94 China is the most recent State to enter the human space flight club. 
95 IADC-02-01: IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines 3.1, (Inter-agency Space Debris 
Coordination Comm., 2002) (revised 2007), available at http://www.iadc-
online.org/index.cgi?item=docs_pub. 
96 FAQ, NASA ORBITAL DEBRIS PROGRAM OFFICE, 
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/faqs.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2012) ("In low Earth orbit 
(below 2,000 km), orbital debris circle the Earth at speeds of 7 to 8 km/s. However, the 
average impact speed of orbital debris with another space object will be approximately 10 
km/s. Consequently, collisions with even a small piece of debris will involve considerable 
energy."). 
97 Id. 
98 NASA, Fengyun-1C Debris: One Year Later, ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS, Jan. 2008, at 3, 
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv12i1.pdf. 
99 Charles D. Lutes, Spacepower in the 21st Century, JOINT FORCE Q., Second Quarter 2008, at 
55, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518749 (“[A spoiler] would seek to 
employ asymmetric power, such as [an ASAT capability], to take advantage of this 
vulnerability. These spoilers are most likely to arise in reaction to a power employing a 
space domination or protection strategy.”).  
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However, the physics of space may actually create a legal limitation to the 
destruction of space objects. 
 
 It is incumbent on the planner of an attack to be sure that the effects 
of the attack will not be indiscriminate.100 Indiscriminate attacks include 
attacks that "employ a method or means of combat the effects of which 
cannot be limited as required by" international law.101 An attack on a 
destructive attack on a space object may violate this principle due to the 
potential debris cloud. 
 
 As already stated, a kinetic attack that destroys a satellite on orbit 
can create a large cloud of debris. The method and means of such an attack 
cannot be limited as required by international law. The first problem is that 
such an attack could put civilian objects at risk due to the number of 
commercial satellites in orbit. This is especially so in light of the fact that not 
all impacts can be accurately predicted, as in the case of Cosmos-2251 and 
Iridium-33 discussed in Part III. The risk of impact with the remains of the 
destroyed satellite by a civilian object would create a situation that could 
constitute an indiscriminate attack. An imperfect analogy can be made to 
the rules regarding sea mines and torpedoes. These means of warfare are 
limited in their use due to the risk that they pose to civilian objects. The 
specific risk is that a civilian object may collide with a mine or torpedo, thus 
detonating it. To ensure that this does not happen States are required to 
ensure that these instruments deactivate after a certain amount of time.102 
In a similar manner, fragmentation debris poses a risk to civilian objects that 
must cross its path. If a commercial satellite collided with space debris 
resulting from an attack by a belligerent, then it could be argued that the 
damage was the result of an attack that was not limited in accordance with 
the laws of armed conflict. Of course, adhering to this rule may create an 
absurd result, in that the destruction of a commercial satellite by space 
debris caused by ASAT activity when not during an armed conflict would 
not be prohibited. However, such damage is covered by international law in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 AP I, supra note 14, Art. 51(4) (“Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.”). 
101 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 22, Rule 12. 
102 SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT 
SEA ¶¶ 79, 82 (1994), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c12563da005fdb1b/7694fe2016f347e1c
125641f002d49ce!OpenDocument.  
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a variety of instruments and doctrines and is therefore not problematic from 
the perspective of the law of armed conflict.103 
 
 Furthermore, an attack causing a wide debris field could violate the 
principle that an attack must not create long term, widespread and severe 
damage to the environment. Environmental considerations must be taken 
into account "when assessing what is necessary and proportionate in the 
pursuit of legitimate military objectives."104 Additional Protocol I states that 
"[i]t is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are 
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment.105 For the purposes of Additional 
Protocol I, widespread "may well be less than several hundred square 
kilometers" and long-term is measured in decades.106 Orbital debris can 
certainly be considered to cause both long term and widespread damage to 
the space environment. Space debris in low earth orbit can remain orbiting 
the entire circumference of the globe for years to decades.107 This inhibits all 
parties from using that particular orbit. However, there could be some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects art. II-III, 
opened for signature Mar. 29 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187, available at 
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf [hereinafter Liability 
Convention]; Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. VII. See INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION, DRAFT ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONALLY 
WRONGFUL ACTS, WITH COMMENTARIES, comment to art. 47, in Rep. of the Intl’l Law 
Comm’n, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10; U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), 
available at untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/.../9_6_2001.pdf. 
104 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 
¶ 30 (July 8). 
105 AP I, supra note 14, art. 35(3). It is important to note that the United States does not see 
this provision as part of customary international law. See Memorandum for John H. 
McNeill, supra note 20, at 399. The Environmental Modification Convention, to which the 
United States is a party, contains a similar prohibition but it is narrower in scope. It only 
applies when the environmental modification is being done intentionally as a means of 
warfare. Therefore it would apply in instances where a belligerent sought to create orbital 
debris as a means of warfare. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other 
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques at arts. I–II, opened for signature May 
18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, 1108 U.N.T.S. 151 (entered into force Oct. 5, 1978) [hereinafter 
ENMOD]. See also Fleck, supra note 14, at 132–33. However, The ENMOD Convention 
specifically mentions outer space affirming that it is part of the natural environment. 
ENMOD, supra, art. II. 
106 DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 191. 
107 NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, supra note 96 ("Debris left in orbits below 600 km 
normally fall back to Earth within several years. At altitudes of 800 km, the time for orbital 
decay is often measured in decades. Above 1,000 km, orbital debris will normally continue 
circling the Earth for a century or more."). 
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dispute as whether such damage is severe or not, since the "[t]he probability 
of two large objects (> 10 cm in diameter) accidentally colliding is very 
low."108 However, these collisions do take place, and are more likely as 
orbital debris increases.109 The meaning of severe under AP I "is not 
sufficiently clear.”110 One can look to the Environmental Modification 
Convention (ENMOD) in order to clarify the term. The Understanding 
attached to Article 1 of the ENMOD Convention states that severe refers to 
"serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and 
economic resources or other assets."111 It can certainly be argued that 
orbital debris significantly harms economic interests in space by placing 
multimillion-dollar assets at risk. Also, space debris poses a threat to the 
natural resource of orbits. However, this definition of severe is limited by its 
terms in the ENMOD convention, which itself is a narrower prohibition 
than that of AP I. 
 
 Not all attacks on satellites will be considered indiscriminate. 
Possibilities for planners to choose methods and means that do not create 
indiscriminate attacks in space do exist. Attacks that use technologies that 
dazzle or blind a remote sensing satellite in order to keep it from viewing a 
specific area will leave the satellite intact and still controlled by the 
adversary.112 The same can be said of jamming or spoofing attacks on 
telecommunications or navigation satellites.113 These attacks only serve to 
disrupt the satellites usefulness to the adversary and not to destroy the 
satellite itself. Cyber attacks can also be used. While a cyber attack can be 
used to completely disable a satellite, it is arguable that this would not create 
an indiscriminate attack. The disabled satellite would fall under the 
definition of space debris, but it would only be a single piece instead of a 
cloud of debris. The creation of a single piece of space debris would 
probably not meet the threshold of widespread, long term, or severe under 
the IHL rubric.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Id. 
109 The Kessler Syndrome is a theory that as orbital debris begins to collide it will increase 
the density of debris in orbit resulting in a debris belt that could threaten space access. See 
generally Donald J. Kessler and Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: 
The Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 J. OF GEOPHYSICAL RES. 2637 (1978). 
110 DINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 191. 
111 ENMOD, supra note 105, annex (Understandings regarding the Convention).  
112 See DAVID WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 36, at 125–30. However, sufficiently powerful 
laser light could permanently damage the satellite. Id. at 128–30. 
113 See id. at 118–23.  
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Conclusion 
 
 Conflict in space is not inevitable, and embracing strong 
international cooperation can reduce the threat of conflict.114 However, the 
political reality is that asymmetric powers will pursue their own self interests, 
which increases the risk of armed conflict in space. While conflict in space in 
not inevitable, it is prudent to be prepared for such situations. Crucial to this 
preparedness is understanding how the rules of international armed conflict 
will be applied in space. International humanitarian law has been developed 
for land, sea, and air operations, and addresses specific differences of each of 
these environments. Space is a drastically different environment, and the 
law will have to be adapted to address the specific issues relating to this 
environment. Many conflict situations that could occur in space highlight 
lacunae in the law of armed conflict. However, application of the core 
principles of international humanitarian law can help to protect the space 
environment so it remains available for the "benefit . . . of all countries."115 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 James D. Rendleman, Space Assurance for the 21st Century, 5 High Frontier Journal, no. 2, 
2009, at 46–48, available at http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-
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115 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. I. 
